IMPLEMENTING ASEAN STOCK TRADING LINKS:  TACKLING THE INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES by Sia, Siew Kien et al.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
PACIS 2016 Proceedings Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems(PACIS)
Summer 6-27-2016
IMPLEMENTING ASEAN STOCK TRADING
LINKS: TACKLING THE INSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES
Siew Kien Sia
Nanyang Technological University, asksia@ntu.edu.sg
Carol Hsu
National Taiwan University, carolhsu@ntu.edu.tw
Wen Jing Teo
Nanyang Technological University, wjteo@ntu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2016
This material is brought to you by the Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been
accepted for inclusion in PACIS 2016 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please
contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Sia, Siew Kien; Hsu, Carol; and Teo, Wen Jing, "IMPLEMENTING ASEAN STOCK TRADING LINKS: TACKLING THE
INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES" (2016). PACIS 2016 Proceedings. 237.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2016/237
 IMPLEMENTING ASEAN STOCK TRADING LINKS:  
TACKLING THE INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
Siew Kien Sia, Division of Information Technology and Operations Management, Nanyang 
Business School, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, asksia@ntu.edu.sg 
Carol Hsu, Institute of Information Management, National Taiwan University, Taiwan, 
carolhsu@ntu.edu.tw  
Wen Jing Teo, Division of Information Technology and Operations Management, Nanyang 
Business School, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, wjteo@ntu.edu.sg 
 
Abstract 
Benefits of financial market integration across different economies have motivated a series of mergers 
and acquisitions, and electronic trading link-ups across regional financial markets. Drawing on 
institutional theory, we look beyond technological solutions to surface strategies in tackling the 
institutional challenges in the context of cross-border financial market integration. Through an 
interpretative case study of ASEAN Exchanges, we found that successful market integration requires 
the active lobbying of regulators to gain regulative legitimacy, peer socialization within the profession 
to attain normative legitimacy, and the reframing of mindsets through education, publicity and new 
symbolic artifacts to achieve cultural-cognitive legitimacy. Results highlight the importance for 
entrepreneurial focal actors to adopt an institutional lens and its respective strategies to enhance the 
success of technology implementation in a highly institutionalized context.  
Keywords: Technology implementation, financial market integration, institutional theory, institutional 
entrepreneurship, ASEAN Exchanges 	  
 	    
 1 INTRODUCTION 
The development of financial market integration across different economies is generally built on the 
potential advantages of increasing capital liquidity, generating capital flows, diversifying international 
investment risks and stimulating investment growth (Obstfeld 1998; Arourie, Jawadi & Nguyen 2010; 
Bekaert et al. 2005). According to Prasad et al. (2003), increased integration of global markets begets 
improvement in market efficiency, and promotes growth in developing countries whilst helping 
countries reduce macroeconomic volatility. Further, with better functioning intermediaries involved, 
market integration can improve resource allocation and accelerate productivity (Beck et al. 2000). 
Over the past two decades, we have witnessed a series of merger and acquisition (M&A) and trading 
link-up activities for both regional and global financial markets.  These developments include the 
convergence of European bond and money markets during the late 1990s, the formation of Euronext in 
2000, the Latin American Integrated Market (known as MILA) recently formed by South American 
countries; and the establishment of Shanghai-Hong Stock Connect in 2014.  
While financial market integrations bear significant economic potential, successful implementations 
are elusive. Thus far, attempts to merger failed due to various challenges: To illustrate, the merger 
between TMX Group and London Stock Exchange (LSE) fell through in 2011 on nationalistic 
grounds; in 2012, to prevent near-monopolizing of European financial derivatives market, the 
European Commission vetoed the merger of NYSE Euronext and Deutsche Börse. Even with a 
sophisticated trading structure, institutional challenges obscure market integration. The ASEAN 
Exchanges is an example where, launched in 2012 with a promise of stimulating capital within 
ASEAN, has yet live up to expectations. Hence, that it is imperative to go beyond economic rationality 
and look at institutional challenges in implementing market integration initiatives.  
Departing from mere economic analysis, we draw on institutional theory to conduct an interpretative 
case study exploring institutional challenges in implementing ASEAN Exchanges and strategies 
employed to tackle them. In the following sections, we review the literature on financial market 
integration, describe the methodological approach and present our preliminary findings. We conclude 
with our contributions, discuss the limitations and future research directions.   
2 BACKGROUND LITERATURE: MARKET INTEGRATION   
Financial market integration is the process of alliances, mergers and cooperation between stock and 
derivatives exchanges for the purpose of increasing the value of stock markets. Any investor located 
within the geographical boundaries is unconstrained by the size of the financial markets (Cybo-Ottone 
et al. 2000; Domowitz 1995; Domowitz & Steil 1999; Hasan & Schmiedal 2004; Lee 1998; Guiso, 
Jappelli, Padula & Pagano 2004). In recent years, scholars have noted the increasing convergence of 
international stock markets (Karolyi & Stulz 2001; Eun & Lee 2010; Mishkin 2007). Much of early 
examinations of financial market integration were focused on its economic impacts encompassing 
economic benefits and risk diversification. Most arguments supporting financial openness indicated 
that despite associated risks, economic benefits of market integration far outweighs its risks. These 
arguments considered benefits of international risk sharing for consumption smoothing, increased in 
domestic investment and growth, enhanced macroeconomic discipline, and increased efficiency and 
stability of domestic financial system that comes with the penetration of foreign banks (Agénor 2003; 
Dorodnyk 2014). Consistent with these findings, Guiso, Kappelli, Padula & Pagano (2004) found that 
from a sample of 22 European countries, financial integration had a positive effect on countries’ and 
sectors’ growth especially in SMEs located in countries with weak financial structure.   
While advocates demonstrated the benefits of economic growth and risk diversification, critics are 
cautious about institutional conditions needed to realize economic gains and risk mitigation. 
Institutional scholars go beyond the viewpoint of markets as a system of economic exchange for the 
simple objective of resource allocation efficiency and uncertainties avoidance, emphasizing the 
 broader level of legal, cultural, and social context in which political and social belief systems 
influence and shape the rules and operations of financial markets (Preda 2007; Carruthers & Kim 
2011). In other words, the dynamics of market development cannot be separated from the 
understanding of its underlying institutional context. For example, the case of nearly 40-year European 
market integration cannot be understood alone without considering embedded pan-regional laws, 
single currency, social belief systems and dynamic interactions that reshaped market rules (Fligstein & 
Sweet 2002). Other researchers seek to broaden the measurement of financial market integration 
beyond just economic indicators to include regulative indicators such as legal system level of 
development (see Adam, Jappelli, Menichini, Padula & Pagano 2002; Edison 2002).  
While growing body of works recognizes institutional challenges in various contexts, there remains a 
paucity of research investigating strategies to tackle institutional challenges in driving market 
integration. Existing literature tends to focus on exploring comparative economic advantages of 
financial market integration, and does not explore the implementation strategies, especially on how an 
integrated financial market gains legitimacy to diffuse successfully. Thus, our study addresses this gap 
to understand institutional challenges arising from market integration, and the strategies in overcoming 
these challenges.  
3 AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE TO FINANCIAL MARKET 
INTEGRATION 
3.1 Institutional Perspective: The Three Pillars  
From an institutional perspective, an initiative must gain institutional legitimacy to diffuse 
successfully. Institutional theorists argued that the environment presents a set of rules, norms and 
beliefs that organizations should conform to gain legitimacy for survival (DiMaggio & Powell 1983); 
the sources of legitimacy are regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive in nature (Scott, 1995).  
The regulative pillar concerns formal rules and existing laws in a particular environment, exerting 
coercive pressure to conform (i.e., what people can or cannot do). According to Scott (1995), the 
regulative aspect deals with the establishment of regulation and the associated mechanisms that 
monitor and enforce regulation compliance, and resolve disputes. The power of legal sanctioning 
provides legitimacy as non-compliance is penalized. 
The normative component refers to societal values and norms that prescribe the desirable and 
appropriate behaviors, exerting normative pressure to conform (i.e., what people should or should not 
do). Specifically, values are the benchmark of shared constructs of desirable behaviors and thoughts in 
society whilst norms are the legitimate means of how things are accomplished. The normative pillar 
basis of legitimacy is morally governed. Socialization in the form of accreditation or certification can 
be used as a means to attain desirable goals within an institutional setting.  
The cultural-cognitive pillar describes prevailing cultural beliefs rooted in an institutional environment 
that shape the interpretive schemas people use when selecting and processing information. Unlike 
desirable norms, it addresses the symbolic and interpretative nature of human activities in a society.  
The basis of legitimacy is recognizable whilst being culturally supported, exerting mimetic pressure to 
conform (i.e., what people typically do or not do).  
Together, these three institutional forces present significant legitimacy challenges for the diffusion of 
new practices. It is critical for an institution to gain legitimacy as its acceptance enables access to 
more resources. Thus, for successful diffusion, a new market integration initiative must deal with 
challenges posed by institutional forces. Past literature on institutional entrepreneurship explored 
strategies to deal with institutional challenges. Oliver (1991) contended that organizations tend to 
respond generally by acquiescing, compromising, avoiding, defying and manipulation. Where 
organizations can conform to institutional forces with minimal consequences, they should; in areas 
 where they cannot, these institutional forces will present themselves as challenges and need to be 
creatively addressed for attaining legitimacy by departing from extant institutional logics.   
3.2 Institutional Entrepreneurship and Strategies to Deal with Institutional Challenges 
Institutional entrepreneurs are organizational actors who envision new institutors as a means of 
advancing highly valued interests despite being suppressed by extant logics and practices (DiMaggio 
1988; Henfridsson & Yoo 2013). Present literature thus far recognized that although institutional 
change is a feat, it is possible and can be led by incumbent organizational actors.  As noted by Scott 
(2011), “In highly institutionalized systems, endogenous change seems almost to contradict the 
meaning of institution” bringing about the paradox of embedded agency (Clemens & Cook 1999; Seo 
and Creed 2002; Sewell 1992). Contrary to institutional discourse, incumbents can change entrenched 
practices if they are motivated by adverse performance feedback, aware of alternative possibilities 
through unique access to global clients, and open to new ideas due to significant asymmetry of 
resources caused by widening misalignment of regulatory and market boundaries (Greenwood & 
Suddaby 2006).  
To initiate institutional change readily, organizations often urge regulatory organizations, including 
legislators and courts, for policies to adapt to new situations via litigation and lobbying. As observed 
by Fligstein and Sweet (2002) in the European Community (EC), the European Court of Justice serve 
as an authoritative figure enforcing treaties and secondary legislation, and tackling litigation brought 
by organizations, individuals and states; further, following the enactment of the Single European Act 
in 1985 in the EC, new lobbying groups, mostly engaging in cross-border transactions, were formed to 
lobby their national governments and the European Commission for favorable rules to liberalize 
markets and replace national regulations with Europeans’. Hence, through litigation, lobbying and 
legislature, organizations could successfully address institutional challenges in the financial markets.  
Besides effecting change at a regulatory level, growing literature has suggested instigating institutional 
changes through a multilevel model approach (Tracey, Phillips & Jarvis 2011; Bell Filatotchev & 
Rasheed 2012). Specifically, institutional strategies at individual, organizational, and macro levels 
were necessary to legitimize novel organizational form in new context; To do so, organizational 
actively reframed problems, engaged in counterfactual thinking, build and theorized the organizational 
template (Tracey et al. 2011), connected with macro-level discourses, and aligned with highly 
legitimate and influential actors by striving for organizational isomorphism with said actors (Tracey et 
al. 2011; Bell et al. 2012). Other measures to mitigate the “liability of foreignness” include the need to 
undergo stricter regulations, to signal good governance and to secure reputational endorsement by 
credible third parties (Bell et al. 2012).  
Expanding on the multilevel model approach, incumbents can tackle institutional challenges 
holistically by actively developing an innovation trajectory to redirect new innovation practices. 
Henfridsson and Yoo (2013) found that to depart from extant industry logic, institutional 
entrepreneurs adopt a “design attitude” characterized by departing from established norms, 
envisioning an alternate future and imagined solution, and experimenting with varied solutions before 
fermenting the best fit solution to actualize their new vision.  
Overall, prior research provides a lens that sensitizes us to various strategies employed in facilitating 
the institutional change. As we proceed to analyze the implementation of financial market integration 
initiative along the three sources of institutional challenges, we are cognizant of similar actions taken 
by various actors in their efforts to initiate institutional change.  
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This study investigated cross-border challenges of financial market integration in the context of 
ASEAN Exchanges, as the initiative fulfilled the criteria of being in implementation phase and access 
to contacts was generously provided by SWIFT Institute. Through an interpretive case approach, we 
 surface related institutional challenges in implementing ASEAN Exchanges. The strengths of 
interpretive case studies include investigating socially constructed meaning that are embedded within 
natural settings, and intertwined with practices and consequences of participants’ social actions. 
Our data collection focused on discourses related to development decisions on ASEAN Exchanges, its 
implementation motivations, and the barriers for cross-ASEAN securities trading. We first gathered 
secondary information to gain a broad understanding about the current state and challenges related to 
the ASEAN Exchanges. We then travelled to ASEAN countries, carried out in-depth interviews with 
various stakeholders from stock exchanges, clearing houses, CSDs, and service providers. Between 
July 2014 and July 2015, 15 face-to-face interviews (individually and in groups) and 2 email 
interviews were conducted with the CEO and senior managers from the Singapore Stock Exchange, 
Indonesia Stock Exchange, Bursa Malaysia, Stock Exchange of Thailand, Philippines Stock Exchange, 
Deutsche Bank and SunGard. Given the sensitive and political nature of views expressed by our 
interviewees, identities of sources are protected in this paper.  
4.1 ASEAN Exchanges 
Aspiring to raise their economic competitiveness, the ASEAN countries foregathered to push for 
deeper regional financial integration. A key commitment is the establishment of the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) by 2015. This optimism is reflected in the rapid growth of the region 
where the ASEAN economies were projected to have real GDP growth by 5.5% per annum in 2013 
and 2014 (ASEAN Integration Report, 2015). One key initiative under AEC is the formation of 
ASEAN Exchange - an integration of seven stock exchanges in Indonesia (IDX), Malaysia (BM), 
Philippines (PSE), Singapore (SGX), Thailand (SET), and Vietnam (HNX, HOSE). Such 
collaboration across ASEAN Exchanges is expected to streamline access to ASEAN capital markets 
with various benefits such attracting investment into the region. The aspiration for an integrated cross-
ASEAN trading infrastructure would enable greater market participation from various stakeholders 
and investors, particularly smaller stockbrokers and individual retail investors who lack access to such 
trading facilities.  
4.2 ASEAN Stock Trading Link  
In 2012, ASEAN Trading Link, a cross-ASEAN trading technology infrastructure was launched. It 
provides a standard interface for ASEAN trades, with a single point of access for market data and 
order routing for all existing ASEAN members and global investors. There are two main components 
in the ASEAN Trading Link that facilitates efficient straight-through processing: The technology 
infrastructure - Intra ASEAN network - comprised a fiber network that connects various national 
exchanges; and the ASEAN Common Exchange gateways - a series of hubs located at each exchange, 
which provide the connecting point for brokers and exchanges. The development and maintenance of 
the entire technology infrastructure is outsourced to SunGard as a third-party vendor where it ensures 
its service offerings to be scalable and flexible – dependent on usage, additional modules required, and 
member countries can choose to join the ASEAN Trading Link later without causing any disruption. 
Cross border trading operations follows an inter-broker model where “home rules apply”, requiring 
investors to abide by the business rules of the home country where shares are transacted.  “Home rule 
apply” addresses incongruent market practices issues with jurisdiction such that home brokers are not 
bypassed. For post-settlement operations,  Deutsche Bank, the selected global payment/custodian 
bank, works closely with the respective exchanges to cater to their unique local requirements (e.g., 
initial system customization to accommodate different account structures or market regulatory 
requirements) so that no changes are needed to existing post-trade processing in each country. 
The ASEAN Trading Link not only streamlines trading arrangements for brokers, but also reduces 
investment and operational costs to access the exchanges in other ASEAN countries, particularly for 
mid-and-small brokers. As such, its “plug and play” infrastructure ensures efficiency and seamless 
trading for brokers to access other exchanges.  
 5 RESEARCH FINDINGS: LEGITIMACY CHALLENGES OF CROSS-
ASEAN SECURITIES TRADING  
While ASEAN Exchanges supported by the Trading Link was technologically sound and operationally 
feasible, the volume of cross-border securities trading in ASEAN Exchanges remained small. Unlike 
project level changes, institutional changes take time as they involve changing underlying regulative, 
normative, and cultural-cognitive contexts. Despite difficulties, our preliminary findings demonstrated 
how institutional entrepreneurs actively strive to ensure legitimacy. For instance, regulative challenges 
are resolved through lobbying efforts by ASEAN Exchanges’ working groups; normative challenges 
are rectified via active peer socialization to raise professional norms; cultural-cognitive challenges are 
settled by reframing preconceived notions of investments (see Figure 1). The following section 
expands on our analysis of institutional challenges and the related attempts to address these three 
challenges can be observed below.  
 
 
Figure 1. Cycle of Institutional Change 
5.1 Regulative Legitimacy Challenges  
For ASEAN Exchanges to thrive, investors should be able to invest freely within ASEAN region. 
However, disparities in market policies, tax regimes, legal jurisdictions, foreign investment restrictions 
and investment protection policies, investors remain hesitant to invest in their ASEAN counterparts. 
For example, issues may arise from disparities between Indonesia’s legal tradition inherited from the 
colonial Dutch and Malaysia and Singapore’s British common law system. The different legal 
jurisdictions are relevant in ensuring enforceability of remedies and impartiality of arbitration in 
situations of dispute settlement. Other uncertainties include the custody arrangements and beneficial 
ownership structure of custody accounts, the enforceability of netting and of novation for the purpose 
of final settlement, and the irrevocability and finality of trade settlement.  
5.1.1 Institutional Strategies – Active Lobbying of Regulators 
To overcome regulative challenges, active lobbying efforts of ASEAN Exchanges working group 
lowered some regulatory barriers. To illustrate, as a result of lobbying by ASEAN Exchange working 
group, the Thai government relaxed its capital gain tax and withheld tax dividends; additionally, Thai 
investors can now hold a foreign currency account by opening an account with Bank of Thailand. 
Similarly, policies prohibiting retail investors in the Philippines from buying non-locally registered 
securities may soon be relaxed to facilitate trading on ASEAN Exchanges. Further, ASEAN 
 Exchanges members proactively lobby ASEAN Capital Market Forum (ACMF), a forum comprising 
the heads of securities regulators in ASEAN. One push was for ACMF to develop the ASEAN 
Disclosure Standards Scheme in 2013, single set of fully harmonized disclosure standards, which was 
based on standards on cross-border equity offerings set by the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions’ (IOSCO). A similar strategy was also employed to tackle multi-jurisdictional collective 
investment schemes (CIS) under ASEAN Framework for Cross-Border of CIS that resulted in the 
development of Asia Fund Passport concept such that CIS such as mutual funds approved in one 
ASEAN country could be approved and sold to another ASEAN country without undergoing 
registration and other formalities in the latter country.  
5.2 Normative Legitimacy Challenges 
Although the exchanges were increasingly adopting standardized trading platforms to stay 
competitive, challenges such as inconsistent trading norms, market practices and industry guidelines 
existed between ASEAN Exchanges and its members. Different degree of fragmentation in trading, 
clearing, and settlement activities engendered different “acceptable” behaviors among market players 
in different countries. Dissimilarities in ownership structure between privately owned IDX and 
demutualized SGX might result in different assessment of business decisions that affects efficiency of 
implementing ASEAN Exchanges. The extent of fragmentation between clearing and settlement 
entities also differs: entities are separated in some countries (e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Philippines) and integrated in others (e.g., Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam). Additionally, different 
permissibility around netting and segregation of trading accounts (e.g., the use of omnibus account), 
and the different clearing and settlement cycles (e.g., T+2, T+3) coupled with differences in time 
zones, business calendars (e.g., holidays) or operating hours (e.g., lunchtime trading) could cause 
trading or settlement delays. Hence, the lack of harmonization led to uncertainty and inefficiency in 
cross-border trading, consequently causing investors to be reluctant to transact in ASEAN Exchanges.  
5.2.1 Institutional Strategies – Peer Socialization to Raise Professional Norms 
To harmonize trading practices, ASEAN Exchanges’ members regularly engaged in regional forums 
to exert pressure on members via peer sharing of experiences in adopting industry best practices, 
international standards, harmonizing listing rules, establishing corporate governance and disclosure 
standards. Hitherto, at least four socialization forums on ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement were held for business and private sector adherents in Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia 
and Brunei Darussalam from 2013 to 2015. Additionally, Indonesia upgraded its IT system to enable 
straight-through processing and align with ASEAN Exchanges. Similarly, in June 2015, PSE launched 
a new PSETradex online trading platform developed by NASDAQ that is also utilized by BM, SGX 
and IDX. Such sharing accelerated the respective countries’ capital development plans to facilitate 
cross-ASEAN integration. Further, PSE worked with ASEAN counterparts (BM and IDX) to increase 
the sophistication of its product offerings by developing a list of syariah-compliant stocks.  
One common narrative among ASEAN Exchanges members was connecting to the macro level 
discourse of establishing AEC. Members often point to the goals of AEC of developing a highly 
competitive region by fostering a single market with a freer flow of goods and services within 
ASEAN, attaining equitable economic development, and achieving greater integration into the global 
economy. Thus, the AEC rhetoric seems to be a common unifying vision that galvanizes the 
commitments of the various exchanges.  
5.3 Cultural-Cognitive Legitimacy Challenges 
Although ASEAN Exchanges targeted retail investors, typical retail investors were entrenched in a 
saving culture, averse to trading as it is sometimes perceived as gambling. Our interview highlighted 
that in Indonesia, for example, the challenge of transforming Indonesia “from a savings society to a 
trading society” remains. For IDX, about 477,000 people (0.19% of the total population) were listed as 
 registered investors. Additionally, according to Shimzu (2014), only 9% of Singaporeans invest in 
stocks compared to 35% in Hong Kong and 17% in Australia; retail investors account for only 20% of 
transactions in Malaysia compared to 60% in South Korea. Moreover, investors are generally unaware 
of investible companies in ASEAN. Trading transactions, if any, are focused on local companies. 
Even for experienced investors, few are aware of listed companies in other ASEAN countries due to 
lack of visibility in their social and cultural surroundings. 
5.3.1 Institutional Strategies – Reframing Mindsets through Education, Publicity, and the Creation 
of New Symbolic Artefacts 
To address these issues, the exchanges actively reframe the notion of trading securities as a viable 
alternative to saving. Our interviews revealed that an investment culture among ASEAN countries was 
fostered through financial education to raise investment literacy. Launched in August 2013, the 
ASEAN Investment online portal provided a one-stop information gateway about ASEAN as a single 
investment destination. Outbound missions from ASEAN-6 to CLMV were also made between 2012 
and 2014. To reach out to potential investors, partnerships with universities, setting up an investment 
outpost (Indonesia), and TV and media publicity (Thailand) were developed. Apart from promoting 
intra-regional investment, trade and investment road shows were held in the US to increase the 
visibility of ASEAN to the US business community (ASEAN Integration Report 2015).  
Further, ASEAN Exchanges actively promoted ASEAN as an asset class; For instance, it introduced 
FTSE ASEAN Index Series that encompasses a suite of indices of ASEAN equity market. Its tradable 
indices are FTSE ASEAN All-Share Index, FTSE ASEAN Sector Indices, FTSE/ASEAN 40 Index 
and FTSE ASEAN Stars Index. These indices serve as tools for creating index tracking funds, 
derivatives and as performance benchmark. ASEAN Exchanges further garnered the support of its 
traders by partnering with well-recognized regional bank CIMB to launch these products. As of 
January 23, 2015, the FTSE ASEAN Stars registered a 12-month 10.8% total return in terms of market 
performance (FTSE Group 2015).  
6 DISCUSSION 
The case of ASEAN Exchanges clearly re-affirms that despite technological readiness, it is a feat to 
successfully diffuse institutional innovations. Hence, crafting a compelling rhetoric for change is 
crucial at every level – the community, professional, and regulator. Such efforts require lobbying of 
regulators, peer socialization to raise professional norms and standards, reframing of problems and 
creating new symbolic artifacts to counter existing mindsets, and building perceived legitimacy by 
connecting to macro-level discourses, and alignment with other credible actors. These efforts 
facilitated institutional changes as they incrementally and interactively served to enhance the 
legitimacy of new practices of ASEAN Exchanges.  
As the market evolves with the disruptions of entrants, institutional entrepreneurs must constantly 
break old practices to make way for new ones to remain relevant through sustained momentum (see 
Figure 1). While employing strategies to deal with institutional challenges, Garud and Karnøe (2001) 
emphasized the importance of generating buzz and momentum to harness the cumulative efforts of 
other non-focal market actors. Hence, future research could explore the collective efforts of multiple 
parties involved and the sustained efforts are required to successfully establish a financial market’s 
institutional legitimacy.   
This paper thus contributes to the literature by bringing a broader view to technology implementation. 
For a successful marketing integration, it is insufficient to talk about managing technology 
implementation at the project level; there is also a need to actively instigate change at the institutional 
level. This is particularly relevant for technology implementation in a heavily institutionalized context, 
as characterized in this case, by the highly regulated financial industry and the cross-country context 
of the ASEAN Exchanges. 
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